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whereby all unsuccessful bidders who so request are given feedback after the contract
is awarded. All Member States, except Denmark (which has an opt-out in the area of
defence policy) and Romania, and Norway participate in this regime.
The second parallel trend is apparent in what was, under the previous dispensation,
the Community legal order and has to do with the applicability of common rules to
defence industries. Article 296 EC (now article 346 TFEU) is relevant: this enables
Member States to deviate from the entire body of EC law in order to protect certain
arms, munitions, and war material in cases where this is necessary for the essential
interests of national security. For a long time, this had been interpreted by the Member
States as exempting them from EU law altogether, an approach largely tolerated by the
Union institutions. However, after a number of initiatives by the Commission in the
1990s38 and mid 2000s,39 this approach changed. On the one hand, the Commission
made it clear that it would bring enforcement actions against Member States in cases
where the strict criteria for the application of article 296 EC were not met.40 Indeed, the
Court of Justice adopted recently a rigorous approach to the application of this pro-
vision.41 On the other hand, two sets of common rules have been adopted which will
apply speciﬁcally to defence products, namely Directive 2009/43 on intra-EU transfers
of defence products,42 and Directive 2009/81 on public procurement.43 These aim to
bring the beneﬁts of the internal market to this sensitive area without compromising its
unique security characteristics.
What we see here is a gradual shift towards the normalisation of the status of
national defence industries within the multilayered EU system. Concerted action at
intergovernmental and supranational level has created a momentum which is a wel-
come addition to the grand rhetoric about the Union’s role in the international security
architecture which emerges from EU statements and policy documents.
PANOS KOUTRAKOS*
II. COMPETITION
A. The Lisbon Treaty
The single most important event in the life of the Union during the three year period
(January 2007–January 2010) under review, and long before, is of course the Lisbon
38 The Challenges facing the European Defence-Related Industry. A Contribution for Action
at European Level COM(96) 10 ﬁnal; Implementing European Union Strategy on Defence
Related Industries COM(97) 583 ﬁnal, adopted on November 12, 1997.
39 European Defence—Industrial and Market Issues. Towards an EU Defence Equipment
Policy COM(2003) 113 ﬁnal, adopted on March 11, 2003; Toward a programme to advance
European security through Research and Technology COM(2004) 72 ﬁnal, adopted on February
3, 2004; Security Research: The Next Step COM(2004) 590 ﬁnal, adopted on September 7, 2004.
40 COM(2006) 779 ﬁnal, adopted on December 7, 2006.
41 Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-2173, and Case C-157/06 Commission v
Italy [2008] ECR I-7313. 42 [2009] OJ L 146/1.
43 [2009] OJ L 216/76.
* University of Bristol.
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Treaty. It and its failed predecessor have deﬁned, and wracked, Union affairs since the
Laeken declaration in 2001. Now, after extensive gestation, lively litigation against
ratiﬁcation—some meritorious, some not—in the courts of six member states (the
United Kingdom,1 the Czech Republic,2 Belgium,3 Latvia,4 Germany,5 Denmark6 and
the Czech Republic (again)7), two referendums in Ireland and an eleventh hour bribe to
the Czech president,8 Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. Its primary
importance lies in change to the constitutional structure of the Union: the dismantling
of the Maastricht pillar system, fusing the European Community (though not Euratom)
and the Union into one, and the blueprint for the Union’s External Action. But amongst
the many, apparently lesser, changes there is one which has gone largely unremarked:
the provisions on competition law are to undergo their ﬁrst material change since 1958.
Since the beginning an article 3 ‘activity’ of the Community has been ‘ensuring that
competition in the common market is not distorted.’9 The Court of Justice was moved
to observe that the competition rules are ‘so essential that without [them] numerous
provisions of the Treaty would be pointless’;10 and subsequently: ‘[A]ccording to
Article 3[(1)(g)] of the EC Treaty. . ., Article 81 . . . constitutes a fundamental provision
which is essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and,
in particular, the functioning of the internal market.’11 In the same way article 3(1)(g)
informed and nurtured article 82 (now article 102 TFEU)12 and article 87 (now article
107 TFEU).13 This is consistent with the manner in which the Court long called upon
the principles of Part One of the EC Treaty. The result is that the competition rules
were fundamental to and accorded a shared primacy in the Community scheme; put
otherwise, according to a past president of the Court, Judge Rodrı´guez Iglesias, ‘the
rules on free movement and competition . . . constitute the core and best established
1 R (on the application of Wheeler) v Ofﬁce of the Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409
(Admin), [2008] All ER (D) 333.
2 Pl. U´S 19/08 ze dne 26. listopadu 2008 (Lisabonska´ smlouva).
3 Grondwettelijk Hof, Arrest Nr 58/2009, van 19 maart 2009 (Sleeckx t/ Vlaamse Gewest).
4 Satversmes tiesa, 2009.gada 7. aprı¯l¸a spriedums lieta¯ Nr 2008-35-1 (Lisabonas lı¯gum).
5 BVerfG, 30. Juni 2009 (‘Lissabon-Vertrag ’ or ‘Solange IV’).
6 Østre Landsret, Hausgaard mod Statsminister & Udenrigsminister, dom af 28. oktober
2009.
7 Pl. U´S 29/09 ze dne 3. listopadu 2009 (Lisabonska´ smlouva II).
8 Ratiﬁcation was eventually coaxed from Mr Klaus only with a promise from the European
Council to extend the application of a Protocol moderating the application of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights in Poland and in the United Kingdom to the Czech Republic ‘at the time of
the conclusion of the next Accession Treaty’; Brussels European Council, 29–30 October 2009,
Presidency Conclusions, para I.2 and Annex I.
9 EEC Treaty, Art 3(f); EC Treaty, Art 3(1)(g), ‘internal’ substituted for ‘common’ market
by Maastricht.
10 Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215, para 24.
11 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time v Benetton International [1999] ECR I-3055, para
36; repeated essentially verbatim in Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, para
20; Cases T-217 & 245/03 Fe´de´ration nationale de la coope´ration be´tail et viande v Commission
[2006] ECR II-4987, para 97.
12 Cases 6 & 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano & Commercial Solvents Corporation v
Commission [1974] ECR 223, para 25; Case 13/77 GB-INNO-BM v Association des de´taillants en
tabac (ATAB) [1977] ECR 2115, para 29; Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR
207, para 183; Case C-95/04P British Airways v Commission [2007] ECR I-2331, paras 106, 143.
13 Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission [1996] ECR II-2109, para 56.
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layer of the [Community] legal order.’14 Since entering its current extended phase of
semi-permanent revision the Treaty has swirled and changed around them, but until
Lisbon the competition provisions survived untouched.
Their pre-eminence was recognized, and boosted, in the Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe, which provided, at the very outset, as a Union objective:
‘The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without
internal frontiers, and a single market where competition is free and undistorted.’15
Codiﬁcation maybe, yet it would have the effect of entrenching competition at the head
of the Treaty, second in terms of the Union’s objectives only to the promotion of peace,
its values and the wellbeing of its peoples,16 and formally at the very heart of the
internal market.
The Lisbon Treaty which rose from the Constitutional Treaty’s ashes still
‘offer[s] . . . an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers’ and
‘establish[es] an internal market’,17 but the ﬁnal (competition) clause is gone. Indeed,
even the existing, never mind promoted, commitment to competition is stripped away.
article 3(1)(g) disappears, the erstwhile ‘activities’ of the Community being dissolved
into Union ‘competences’18 with no mention of competition save that the TFEU
recognizes (syllogistically) ‘the establishing [sic] of the competition rules necessary
for the functioning of the internal market’ to be an exclusive Union competence.19 The
substantive rules of Articles 81-89 EC survive essentially unscathed, becoming
Articles 101 to 109 TFEU,20 but they are left without the prop at the head of the Treaty
which for so long anchored them there.
This eleventh hour change was implemented at French insistence, which won
the (surprising?) acquiescence of the other heads of State and government. But as a
response to those who feared the total absence from the Treaty of a commitment to
competition, the European Council agreed, and the IGC homologated, a new protocol
attached to the Treaties, reading as follows:
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
CONSIDERING that the internal market as set out in article 3 of the Treaty on European
Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted,
HAVE AGREED that:
to this end the Union shall, if necessary, take action under the provisions of the Treaties,
including under article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.21
This is a wretched provision. It is badly drafted: it would be difﬁcult to marshal more
ﬂannel in so short a passage. The internal market is not ‘set out’ (de´ﬁni; beschrieben) in
article 3, it is simply postulated there to exist. Contrary to general conventions of
legislative (and judicial) drafting, the text of the protocol is not self-contained: rather,
the operative part is logically (if not grammatically) dependent upon and subordinate to
14 GC Rodrı´guez Iglesias, inaugural address to the FIDE XX Congress, 2002, London.
15 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Art I-3(2).
16 Art. I-3(1). The Union’s values were set out in Art I-2.
17 TEU (Lisbon), Art 3(2), (3). 18 TFEU, Arts 2–6.
19 Art 3(1)(b).
20 The only signiﬁcant change is introduction of authority for the Council to remove (ﬁve
years after the entry into force of Lisbon) the privileged position enjoyed by Germany under Art
107 TFEU since 1958 and not altered at reuniﬁcation, in granting state aids to areas ‘affected by
the division of Germany’; see TFEU, Art 107(2)(c).
21 Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition.
Current Developments 491
the preamble, which does no more than rehearse a ‘consideration’ of the Contracting
Parties. Nor does it have the character of an integration clause (Querschnittsklausel)
such as those now forming Title II of Part One of the TFEU (the provisions having
general application). If it has utility at all it would appear to lie in supplying a Treaty
base for Union action, and in particular action which exceeds the authority granted by
article 103 TFEU (article 83 EC)—which is what article 352 provides anyway, without
need of assistance from this protocol. And any such action must be ‘necessary’, which
is presumably (but not necessarily) a matter for the judgment of the political insti-
tutions.
Its greater impact is likely to lie less in its wording that in its location at (or lagging
behind) the tail end of the Treaties. Given the Treaty style of progression from the
general to the speciﬁc, and the core to the peripheral, the fall from a Community
activity (EC Treaty) or a Union objective (constitutional Treaty) to a preambular ref-
erence in the 27th of 37 protocols attached to the Treaties which recites a view held by
the parties is by any measure a demotion. What then will the Court of Justice make if
it? Not, perhaps, a frontal assault on the core provisions— Articles 101 and 102—
which can stand on their own, but maybe at the periphery. For example, there is a
complex of settled case law which draws upon articles 101/102 in combination with
articles 3(1)(g) and 10 EC (now absorbed into article 4(3) TEU) which determines and
deﬁnes the duty of a member State not to introduce or maintain in force any national
rules which might render the application of Articles 101 and 102 ineffective.22 It
has always been a ﬁne balance. With article 3(1)(g) gone, can it survive and be
maintained? Maybe there will be no change: the Court may determine competition, as
developed by 50 years of case law, salvaged (just) by the competition protocol, to be in
the very DNA of the internal market irrespective of the Lisbon reordering. It might, on
the other hand, ﬁnd that the Herren der Vertra¨ge must have intended the change to
have some outcome, and downgrade competition concerns accordingly. Whichever it
chooses, it is to be watched closely.
B. Microsoft
No comment upon competition law during the period would be complete without
mention of the Microsoft judgment, ‘widely described as the most important antitrust
case in European history’,23 delivered by the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI,
22 See Case 311/85 Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisebureaus v Sociale Dienst van
de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiesten [1987] ECR 3801; Case 267/86 van Eycke v
ASPA [1988] ECR 4769; Case C-41/90 Ho¨fner v Mactrotron [1991] ECR I-1979; Case C-2/91
Criminal Proceedings against Meng [1993] ECR I-5751; Case C-185/91 Bundesanstalt fu¨r den
Gu¨terfernverkehr v Gebru¨der Reiff [1993] ECR I-5801; Case C-245/91 Criminal proceedings
against Ohra Schadeverzekeringen [1993] ECR I-5851 (the latter three, along with the Keck
judgment (Cases C-267 & 268/91 Criminal proceedings against Keck & Mithouard [1993] ECR
I-6097), comprising the ‘November revolution’ on greater deference to national regulation);
see most recently Case C-531/07 Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft v LIBRO
Handelsgesellschaft, judgment of 30 April 2009, not yet reported, per A-G Trstenjak, paras 109–
196 of her opinion.
23 Buck, ‘Microsoft bows to the EU system’ Financial Times, 17 September 2007.
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although now, post-Lisbon, styled the General Court) in September 2007.24 Even
before then the case had attracted controversy, as part way through the proceedings
Judge Legal complained (publicly) of a ﬁfth column of ‘ayatollahs de la libre en-
treprise’ amongst the re´fe´rendaires in the Court,25 and as a result was relieved of the
responsibility of judge-rapporteur and the case was removed from the extended
chamber of which he was president and referred to the Grand Chamber. If some other
retired judges share similar sentiments, they give them voice with greater circum-
spection.
In brief, the CFI sustained the Commission in ﬁnding that Microsoft had infringed
article 102 in two distinct respects: by refusing to supply protected interoperability
information to competing workshop server operating systems and by tying its
Windows Media Player (WMP) to its dominant operating system.26 Whilst the case
was before the CFI the Commission imposed record ﬁnes for failure to comply with
behavioural remedies it had ordered as part of the original decision,27 with which
Microsoft complied to its satisfaction only in October 2007. The widely expected
appeal to the Court of Justice never materialized, largely because Microsoft simply lost
the necessary heart to carry on, so the judgment of the CFI is now res judicata. In order
to extract a ﬁnal pound of ﬂesh, in early 2008 the Commission instituted proceedings
afresh against Microsoft for (alleged) tying of the internet explorer to the Windows
operating system, but Microsoft has now offered a series of commitments on increasing
the choice of web browser and improved operability, to which, at the time of writing,
the Commission seems kindly disposed.28
A great deal of ink has been spilled on the judgment and there is little space here to
do it justice. To its critics the CFI weakened the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test ﬁrst
recognized inMagill,29 rendering instances of compulsory licensing much more likely,
impairing legal certainty, diminishing intellectual property rights and so having a
chilling effect upon innovation and economic progress. The burdens for Microsoft of
article 102 are emphasized: they have always been especially onerous for a monopoly
or for an undertaking which enjoys ‘dominance approaching monopoly’, ‘super-
dominance’ or ‘overwhelming dominance verging on monopoly.’30 But the CFI seems
to suggest that merely acquiring a signiﬁcant market share may be an abuse of a
dominant position:
It must be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that article 82 EC covers not only
practices which may prejudice consumers directly but also those which indirectly prejudice
them by impairing an effective competitive structure. In this case, Microsoft impaired the
effective competitive structure on the work group server operating systems market by
acquiring a signiﬁcant market share on that market.31
24 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601.
25 ‘Le contentieux communautaire de la concurrence entre controˆle restreint et pleine
juridiction’, Concurrences, Nx 2-2005, 1–2.
26 Decision 2007/53 (Microsoft) OJ 2007 L32/23 (summary publication).
27 See below.
28 Case COMP/39.530 (Microsoft (Tying)), OJ 2009 C242/20.
29 Cases C-241 & 242/91P RTE & ITP v Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR I-743.
30 Cases C-395 & 396/96P Compagnie Maritime Belge v Commission [2000] ECR II-1365,
per AG Fennelly, paras 132, 137 of his opinion.
31 Case T-201/04 Microsoft (n 24) para 664.
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This appears to reproach Microsoft simply for becoming dominant, which would seem
to turn article 102 on its head. Whether or not it is ‘Microsoft-speciﬁc’ waits upon the
next Commission decision involving superdominance.32
A more general outcome worth noting in particular is the CFI’s view of its
own authority. The Court of Justice has said surprisingly little about the standard
of proof required to show an infringement of Articles 101 or 102. To the terse con-
sideration set out in 198433 the CFI (which since its inception has held the Commission
to greater account than did the Court of Justice previously) added useful guidance
in 2007: evidence must be adduced ‘to the requisite legal standard’, it is necessary
to take account of the presumption of innocence, ‘any doubt in the mind of the
Court’ must operate to the advantage of the undertaking, and ‘the Commission must
show precise and consistent evidence in order to establish the existence of the in-
fringement and to support the ﬁrm conviction that the alleged infringements constitute
appreciable restrictions of competition. . ..’34 This is very helpful. Yet here is the CFI
in Microsoft:
Although as a general rule the Community Courts undertake a comprehensive review
of the question as to whether or not the conditions for the application of the competition
rules are met, their review of complex economic appraisals made by the Commission
is necessarily limited to checking whether the relevant rules on procedure and on
stating reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated
and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or a misuse of powers.
Likewise, in so far as the Commission’s decision is the result of complex technical
appraisals, those appraisals are in principle subject to only limited review by the
Court . . . .35
Given the extensive powers of sanction enjoyed by the Commission under Regulation
1/2003 and the manner in which it is exercised, this approach is surely unduly timid.
Yet it has been reconﬁrmed by the CFI, again in the context of article 102, since
Microsoft.36 It is problematic not only in itself, but for keeping on the right side of
article 6 of the ECHR and for the civil enforcement of Articles 101 and 102, promoted
vigorously by the Commission as part of the decentralisation programme,37 especially
where Articles 101/102 are applied co-terminously with equivalent provisions of
national law, now compulsory where both Union and national law are joined,38 yet
different standards of proof apply to the national provisions.
1. GlaxoSmithKline
But the Court sometimes giveth with the same hand it taketh. GlaxoSmithKline plc
(GSK) is a dominant ﬁrm in various pharmaceuticals markets in Europe and beyond, of
32 Passing reference was made toMicrosoft in the Commission’s Intel decision (Case COMP/
37.990 (Intel) OJ 2009 C227/13 (summary publication), para 880; under review as Case T-286/09
Intel v Commission, pending) but without the vehemence.
33 Cases 29 & 30/83 Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines & Rheinzink v Commission
[1984] ECR 1679.
34 Case T-36/05 Coats Holdings & JP Coats v Commission [2007] ECR II-110*, paras 68–71.
35 Case T-201/04 Microsoft (n 24) paras 87–88.
36 Case T-301/04 Clearstream Banking & Clearstream International v Commission, judg-
ment of 9 September 2009, not yet reported, paras 93–95.
37 See below. 38 Regulation 1/2003, Art 3(1).
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late involved in polycephalous litigation before the Court of Justice. Its strategy for the
distribution of a number of prescription medicines in Greece attracted the attention of
the Greek Competition Authority (the EpitropgB AntacvnismouB , or ‘EpAnt’), which
referred a number of questions to the Court on the circumstances in which a refusal to
sell may constitute an infringement of article 102. This of course raised issues related
to those of Bayer39 but in the context of article 102 rather than 101. The reference
resulted in a deft and, in the event, prescient opinion from Advocate-General Jacobs
but was rebuffed by the Court because the EpAnt was not a court or tribunal for
purposes of article 267 TFEU.40 A sister action raised by disgruntled intermediary
wholesalers (amongst them complainants to the EpAnt) in the civil courts resulted in a
fresh reference, questions effectively identical to those already referred, and so the case
returned to the Court ‘like a boomerang.’41
GSK did not dispute that its purpose in refusing to meet the Greek wholesalers’
orders was to limit parallel exports by wholesalers to the markets of other member
States in which the selling prices of the medicinal products in dispute were higher.
Normally such restriction of parallel trade by a dominant undertaking is to be re-
proached under article 102 where the curbing of parallel trade is an effect of the
practice, never mind its object.42 However, here the Court of Justice, possibly taking its
cue from Advocate-General Jacobs’ earlier opinion, said that a dominant undertaking
‘must nevertheless be in a position to take steps that are reasonable and in proportion to
the need to protect its own commercial interests.’43 This would include (implicitly)
safeguarding investment in the research and development of medicines and (explicitly)
taking such reasonable and proportionate measures in relation to the threat that parallel
exports represent to its legitimate commercial interests.44 It was therefore justiﬁed in
refusing to ﬁll orders which were out of the ordinary in terms of quantity.45 Such is the
heavy regulation, and so distortion, of markets in medicinal products that peculiar
considerations may apply which are not applicable elsewhere. Nevertheless this marks
a suppleness to article 102 which is consistent with the more economic approach now
encouraged it its application, and is largely to be welcomed.
A GlaxoSmithKline footnote involves yet another case, a review launched by GSK
of a Commission decision ﬁnding an infringement of article 101(1) in its price dis-
crimination on the Spanish market and (this happening prior to 2004) refusing an
exemption.46 The CFI found the infringement proven but annulled the decision not to
grant an exemption.47 An appeal (by GSK, on the infringement) and cross-appeal
39 Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383; on appeal, Cases C-2 & 3/01P
Bundesverband der Arzneimittel Importeure v Bayer & Commission [2004] ECR I-23.
40 Case C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) v
GlaxoSmithKline [2005] ECR I-4609.
41 Cases C-468 etc/06 Sot. Le´los Kai Sia v Glaxosmithkline Farmakeftikon Proı¨onton [2008]
ECR I-7139, per A-G Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, para 1 of his opinion.
42 See e.g. Case 26/75 General Motors Continental v Commission [1975] ECR 1367.
43 Cases C-468 etc/06 Sot. Le´los (n 41) para 69.
44 ibid para 70. 45 ibid para 76.
46 Decision 2001/791 (Glaxo Wellcome) OJ 2001 L302/1.
47 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969.
Current Developments 495
(by the Commission) was dismissed by the Court of Justice,48 an otherwise un-
remarkable judgment noteworthy for the following passage:
It must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like other competition rules laid
down in the Treaty, article 81 EC aims to protect not only the interests of competitors
or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as
such.49
This apparently innocuous proposition, easily missed at ﬁrst reading, is, maybe,
a bombshell. It harks back to an earlier view of the competition rules, disavowed
vigorously for many years now, not least by Mrs Kroes: ‘the objective of article 82 is
the protection of competition on the market. . .. [I]t is competition, and not competitors,
that is to be protected.’50 It is quite possibly a slip of the rapporteur’s pen, but if not,
could lead to signiﬁcant change to our understanding of Articles 101 and, perhaps more
so, 102.
C. Enforcement
1. Commission enforcement
Commission avarice continues apace, ﬁnes imposed, for cartel infringements alone
(which ‘by reason of their very nature . . . merit the severest ﬁnes’51), of E3,334 mil-
lion in 2007, E2,271 million in 2008 and E1,822 million in 2009. To date the highest
cartel ﬁne, imposed in 2008, is E1,384 million, in respect of a ﬁve year cartel amongst
four undertakings in the automotive glass sector,52 one of the participating under-
takings, Saint-Gobain SA, ﬁned E896 million (its ﬁne increased by 60 per cent as a
‘repeat offender’), representing the then highest single ﬁne imposed upon an under-
taking for a competition law infraction anywhere in the world. Within a year the Saint-
Gobain record was eclipsed, Intel Corporation suffering a ﬁne of E1,060 million for
breach of article 102 involving ﬁdelity rebates and direct payments to downstream
manufacturers to halt or delay use of its (only effective) competitor’s components.53
The highest total ﬁnes imposed upon a single undertaking is E1,677 million, upon
Microsoft, comprising a ﬁne of E497 million in 2004 for the two concurrent in-
fringements of article 102 and a further E1,180 million (E280.5 million in 2006 and
E889 million in 2008) for failure to comply with behavioural remedies ordered by the
Commission in the 2004 decision.54 Whether this ferocity will be maintained when
48 Cases C-501, 513, 515 & 519/06P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission and
Commission v GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited, judgment of 6 October 2009, not yet
reported. 49 ibid para 63.
50 ‘Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82’ a speech at Fordham Corporate
Law Institute, 23 September 2005.
51 Case T-127/04 KME Germany v Commission, judgment of 6 May 2009, not yet reported,
para 64.
52 Case COMP/39.125 (Automotive Glass) OJ 2009 C173/13 (summary publication); under
review as, inter alia, Case T-73/09 Compagnie de Saint-Gobain v Commission, pending. The total
of E1,383,896,000 came after a reduction was made (to Asahi of Tokyo, 50 percent for cooper-
ation) under the Commission’s leniency programme, the ﬁnes originally computed at E1,497
million.
53 Case COMP/37.990 Intel (n 32).
54 Case COMP/37.792 (Microsoft), decisions of 12 July 2006 and of 27 February 2008,
unpublished.
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Mr Almunia assumes the post of competition Commissioner is anyone’s guess. Also
worth noting is some light relief provided by the German energy ﬁrm E.ON AG: in the
course of an investigation into a market sharing cartel in the German and French gas
markets, for which E.ON and GDF Suez SA were in due course each ﬁned E553
million,55 someone at E.ON broke the seals left overnight by the Commission during
its on-site investigation at E.ON’s premises in Munich and re-afﬁxed them (badly). For
this E.ON was ﬁned E38 million.56 Protestations that that the incriminating damage to
the seals was caused instead by poor adhesion, wiping by a cleaner with a liquid
detergent, shearing stress and/or peeling, age-related deterioration, ‘creeping’, building
vibration or humidity were rebuffed. It is the ﬁrst ﬁne to be imposed by the
Commission under Regulation 1/2003 for ‘intentionally or negligently’ breaking seals
afﬁxed by the Commission in the course of, and so seeking to frustrate, a Commission
inspection.57
2. Civil enforcement
That infringement of Articles 101 and 102 may result in liability in damages for any
injury or loss to a third party was ﬁnally recognized by the Court of Justice implicitly in
200158 and explicitly in 2006.59 Since then the Commission has been championing the
cause of private enforcement, producing to that end a Green Paper in 200560 and a
(brief) White Paper in 2008.61 As if to emphasize its resolve, in mid-2008 the
Commission raised a follow-on claim for damages before the Brussels Tribunal
de commerce against the four parties to the lift/escalator cartel,62 resulting in a (then
record) ﬁne of E992 million, they having supplied the lifts and escalators in various of
the Commission buildings. It raises interesting issues of (presumed) Commission re-
liance in a private action upon information it had itself gathered in the course of an
investigation (in principle to be used only ‘for the purpose for which it was acquired’)63
and a cartel the existence of which it had itself formally established.
55 Case COMP/39.401 (E.ON/GDF) OJ 2009 C248/5 (summary publication).
56 Case COMP/39.326 (E.ON Energie), decision of 30 January 2008, unpublished.
57 Regulation 1/2003 OJ 2003 L1/1, Art 23(1)(e).
58 Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297.
59 Cases C-295 etc/04 Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni [2006] ECR I-6619; see the
previous current developments report at (2007) 56 ICLQ 422, 427.
60 Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672 ﬁnal.
61 Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 ﬁnal. See also the
(more extensive) Commission Staff Working Papers accompanying the White Paper, SEC(2008)
404 and 405 and the (very extensive) impact report commissioned and published by the
Commission, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and
potential scenarios, December 2007. For criticism see editorial comments, ‘A little more action
please!—The White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’ (2008) 45
CMLR 609–615; Kortmann & Swaak, ‘The EC White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions: Why
the Member states are (Right to be) Less Than Enthusiastic’ [2009] ECLR 340–351.
62 Case COMP/38.823 (Lifts and Escalators) OJ 2008 C75/19 (summary publication).
63 Regulation 1/2003, Art 28(1). An exception is made for (‘without prejudice to’) the
transmission from the Commission of information in its possession relevant to matters before a
requesting national court (Art. 15) but this does not solve the problem of the Commission’s direct
interest in the case.
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Following up its own initiatives, in 2009 the Commission drafted a proposal for a
directive, the ﬁrst ever under article 103, on actions for damages.64 It was never for-
mally proposed to the Council and it has now been disavowed, in part a result of a
disagreement between Commission and Parliament as to correct legal base (article 103
or 114 (internal market harmonization) and/or 352, maybe even 81 (judicial cooper-
ation in civil matters)).65 But it has, inevitably, leaked. Its purpose was to set out ‘the
rules necessary to ensure that anyone who has suffered a harm [sic] caused by an
infringement of article 81 or 82 of the Treaty can effectively enforce the right to full
compensation.’66 ‘Full’ compensation is intended to restore the injured party to the
position s/he would have been in had the infringement not occurred, so including actual
loss, loss of proﬁt and payment of interest from the time of the event to the time of
compensation,67 effectively codifying the Manfredi case law. The measure required
provision for group actions brought by two or more injured parties68 and representative
actions brought by ‘qualiﬁed entities’69 (without specifying an ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’
approach) and contained provisions on disclosure of evidence,70 passing on of over-
charges71 and—a difﬁcult issue marked by a wide variety in national law—limiting
any requirement of proof of fault beyond proof of the infringement and of injury, to
erring undertakings not reasonably having been aware that their conduct distorted
competition.72 Otherwise it did not interfere with civil procedure save for the standard
recitation (already recognized in Manfredi) of the requirements of effectiveness and
equivalence.73
Given the enthusiasm the Commission has invested in the issue the proposal
is surprisingly unambitious. It does little to settle the difﬁculties the Commission
itself canvassed in the White Paper. It does not address the fraught question of
quantifying injury or loss (although it did subsequently publish a useful report it had
commissioned on that matter74) and makes no provision for the double damages
Mrs Kroes had thought ‘worth considering’,75 nor does it seem to be alive to the
risks and costs of private litigation or recognize the chilling effect the encouragement
of follow-on claims may have upon the (considerable) success of the Com-
mission’s leniency programme. Not yet out of the starting blocks, the matter will now
fall to Mr Almunia, and his enthusiasm, or otherwise, for the project is an unknown
quantity.
64 Proposal for a Council Directive on rules governing actions for damages for infringements
of Arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty, unpublished.
65 The draft Directive proposes Art 103 as its legal base but, in the view of the Parliament,
‘[t]he Commission can certainly not base its measures in the area of national damages and pro-
cedural law on Treaty Article [103]’; Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Report on
the White Paper on damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules, A6-0123/2009, p 9.
66 Art 1(1). 67 Art 1(2).
68 Art 5. There are difﬁculties here for some member states in which it is contrary to general
principles of civil law. 69 Arts 6, 7.
70 Arts 8, 9. 71 Art 11. 72 Art 14. 73 Art 2.
74 Quantifying antitrust damages: Towards non-binding guidance for courts, December 2009.
75 ‘Reinforcing the ﬁght against cartels and developing private antitrust damages actions: the
tools for a more competitive Europe’, a speech to the Commission/International Bar Association
joint conference, 8 March 2007.
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3. Damages from the Commission
Mention should be made of fallout from the Commission’s annus horribilis of 2002 in
merger control. Following the pasting the Commission received from the CFI in the
Airtours case,76 Airtours (having become MyTravel) raised an action seeking damages
from the Commission in the region of £500 million. Schneider Electric SA was less
modest: having been barred by the Commission from acquiring control of a competitor
(Legrand SA) by means of a public exchange offer, that decision also set aside by the
CFI,77 it sought E1.6 thousand million in damages.
For an action in damages against a Union institution to succeed it is necessary to
show not only illegality, injury and causation, but a breach of its legal duty which is
‘sufﬁciently serious’, one by which it manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on
its discretion.78 In the administrative sphere the margin of discretion may narrow such
that the duty may be characterized as one of ordinary care and diligence:79 where the
institution ‘has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, [so that] the mere
infringement of Community law may be sufﬁcient to establish the existence of a suf-
ﬁciently serious breach.’80 The functions the Commission discharges under Regulation
1/2003 are, certainly in some measure, of an administrative character. Yet MyTravel
was rebuffed.81 Notwithstanding the original Commission decision having been
‘vitiated by a series of errors of assessment as to factors fundamental to any [proper]
assessment. . .’,82 the CFI said:
It is necessary to bear in mind that the economic analyses necessary for the characterisation
in competition law . . . involve generally . . . complex and difﬁcult intellectual exercises,
which may inadvertently contain some inadequacies, such as approximations, incon-
sistencies, or indeed certain omissions.. . . That does not mean . . . that the Commission
committed a manifest and grave infringement of its discretion . . ., provided that—as in the
present case—it is capable of explaining the reasons for which it could reasonably form the
view that its assessments were well founded.83
Schneider Electric fared slightly better. The CFI said that damages cannot lie against
the Commission for:
all errors or mistakes which, even if of some gravity, are not by their nature or extent alien
to the normal conduct of an institution entrusted with the task of overseeing the application
of competition rules, which are complex, delicate and subject to a considerable degree of
discretion. . .. On the other hand, the right to compensation for damage resulting from the
conduct of the institution becomes available where such conduct takes the form of action
76 Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585 (annulling Decision 2000/276
(Airtours/First Choice) OJ 2000 L93/1).
77 Case T-77/02 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] ECR II-4201 (annulling Decision
2004/275 (Schneider/Legrand) OJ 2004 L101/1).
78 These are tests which adhere to the case law attending actions for damages against the
Union under Arts 268 and 340 TFEU; see Case C-352/98P Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques
Bergaderm and anor v Commission [2000] ECR I-5291; Case C-312/00P Commission v Camar &
Tico [2002] ECR I-11355; Cases T-344 & 345/00 CEVA Sante´ Animale & Pharmacia Entreprises
v Commission [2003] ECR II-229.
79 Case T-178/98 Fresh Marine v Commission [2000] ECR II-3331.
80 Case C-312/00P Camar & Tico (n 78) para 54; Case 282/05P Holcim (Deutschland) v
Commission [2007] ECR I-2941, para 47.
81 Case T-212/03 MyTravel Group v Commission [2008] ECR II-1967.
82 Case T-342/99 Airtours (n 76) para 294.
83 ibid paras 81, 87.
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manifestly contrary to the rule of law and seriously detrimental to the interests of persons
outside the institution and cannot be justiﬁed or accounted for by the particular constraints
to which the staff of the institution, operating normally, is objectively subject.84
Accordingly the CFI found infringements of Schneider’s rights of defence and awarded
it damages for expenses it had incurred in respect of participation in the resumed
merger control procedure following the 2002 judgment and (partial) damages for loss
of the sale price when complying with a Commission order of divestment. The Court of
Justice was less generous, setting aside the second award for lack of sufﬁcient causal
link.85 Although damages for serious ﬂaws in the Commission’s economic reasoning
(sufﬁcient to lead to the annulment of the decision) ‘cannot be ruled out in principle’,86
the breadth of Commission latitude and the article 340 requirement of a sufﬁciently
serious breach by which it ‘manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its
discretion’87 appears to confer upon it (virtual) immunity. On one view, if the
Commission escaped liability inMyTravel, it will prove almost impossible to ﬁnd it on
a substantive matter in a merger case.
4. Damages from within an undertaking
An even bolder claim has been launched in England, in a matter involving UK com-
petition law but the result easily transferable to the Union stage. In 2007 the Ofﬁce of
Fair Trading found, provisionally, a breach of Section 2(1) of the Competition Act
(=article 101(1) TFEU) in price ﬁxing of dairy products amongst a number of British
supermarkets, through repeated exchange and disclosure of commercially sensitive
retail pricing intentions. One of the supermarkets, Safeways, entered into an ‘early
resolution’ agreement with the OFT, as part of the terms of which it admitted the
breach of Section 2(1). Safeways (now Morrisons) has now brought a claim for
damages and/or equitable compensation against a number of defendants, all of them
directors or employees of Safeways at the material time, for breach of ﬁduciary duty
and/or breach of contract of employment and/or negligence, and conspiracy, identify-
ing the defendants as direct participants in the price ﬁxing, being anticompetitive
measures and unlawful acts, and seeking recovery of the loss it incurred (the penalty
imposed by the OFT, likely to be £10.7 million with leniency) and legal costs.88
Certainly Safeways has mountains to climb. It must show that the unlawful conduct
can be attributed to the directors and/or employees, that they can be held civilly liable
(the Competition Act being silent on this), that it can overcome the ex turpi causa non
oritur actio rule,89 and that it can, in effect, pass on the penalty, so arguably depriving
it of its teeth, certainly its (legitimate) deterrence purpose. But should it succeed it will
start a new chapter in enforcement of the competition rules. The question then will be
84 Case T-351/03 Schneider Electric v Commission [2007] ECR II-2237, paras 122–124.
85 Case C-440/07P Commission v Schneider Electric, judgment of 16 July 2009, not yet
reported.
86 Case T-212/03 MyTravel (n 81) para 80.
87 ibid para 37.
88 sub. nom. Safeway Stores Ltd v Twigger and ors, pending.
89 See Gibbs Mew v Gemmell [1998] 1 EGLR 43 (CA), applying the rule in the context of a
breach of Art 101; now moderated by the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-453/99
Crehan (n 58).
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whether it is a remedy speciﬁc to English private law or whether it will have a wider
currency.
5. Criminal enforcement
Enforcement of competition law by means of criminal sanctions gathers momentum. In
Ireland, where infringements of the Competition Act have attracted criminal penalties
since 1996,90 custodial sentences have now been imposed in ﬁve cases,91 each a price
ﬁxing cartel and each for infringement of Irish law alone, and not of article 101 which
is possible under the Competition Act. In no case was the guilty party required to serve
his sentence. In the United Kingdom ﬁrst convictions have been secured for com-
mission of the ‘cartel offence’ created by section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002.
Unlike the Irish legislation, the cartel offence is not wholly co-terminious with the
prohibitions of the Competition Act: it is instead a distinct offence, the bar set very
high (the parties must enter into a price ﬁxing, production or supply limitation, market
sharing or bid rigging agreement and must do so with dishonesty), such that it was
thought by some that a prosecution could never succeed. Now it has. The case arose out
of the global price ﬁxing and bid-rigging marine hose cartel, parties to which were the
six principal manufacturers, from three continents, of marine hoses worldwide
(Bridgestone Corp, Yokohama Rubber Co (both of Japan), Dunlop Oil & Marine Ltd/
ContiTech AG (England/Germany), Trelleborg Industrie SA/Trelleborg AB (Sweden/
France), Parker ITR Srl/Parker Hanneﬁn Corp (Italy/USA) and Manuli Rubber SpA
(Italy)). The cartel attracted the attention of the Department of Justice in the United
States, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (the Ko¯torii) and, eventually, the
Commission, which imposed ﬁnes totalling E131.5 million for multiple infringements
of article 101.92 It also marked the ﬁrst time the Commission inspected a private home,
that of the owner/manager of a consulting ﬁrm who was effectively the cartel coordi-
nator, under article 21 of Regulation 1/2003.93 The matter is still subject to proceedings
under the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission which ﬁled papers in the
federal courts in the summer of 2009. The three accused were managing director, sales
and marketing manager of Dunlop Oil and Marine and a Dunlop ex-employee, sub-
sequently cartel coordinator through his private consultancy (for which he earned an
annual fee of $50,000 from each participating company). They were given custodial
sentences of 24, 20 and 30 months respectively (after reduction by the Court of Appeal
from the 36, 30 and 36 months imposed by the Crown Court)94 and disqualiﬁed from
acting as a director of a limited company for 7, 5 and 7 years. But we are little wiser as
to the meaning and breadth of the cartel offence as the three entered guilty pleas as part
of a plea agreement with US authorities. A clearer picture may emerge following the
90 See now Competition Act, 2002 (No 14 of 2002), ss 6, 7.
91 DPP v Flanagan and ors (or the Connaught Oil cases), a series of circuit criminal court
judgments between 2004 and 2006, none reported (one sentence of six months imposed upon the
cartel ‘facilitator’, suspended); DPP v Manning, judgment of the Central Criminal Court of
9 February 2007, unreported (12 months, suspended); DPP v Durrigan & Doran, guilty pleas in
circuit criminal court in May and October 2008 (three months, suspended); DPP v Duffy [2009]
IEHC 208 (six and nine months concurrently, suspended).
92 Case COMP/39.406 (Marine Hoses) OJ 2009 C168/6 (summary publication).
93 ibid para 6.
94 R v Whittle, Allison & Brammar [2008] EWCA 2560, [2008] All ER (D) 133.
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transatlantic price ﬁxing cartel in fuel surcharges between British Airways and Virgin
Atlantic, for which BA was ﬁned £121.5 million by the Ofﬁce of fair Trading95 and
$300 million by the US Department of Justice,96 both BA and Virgin facing extensive
civil liability in both the UK and the US. Charges were subsequently preferred against
four BA executives in England (Virgin and its executives having gained the immunity
from prosecution afforded whistleblowers),97 the matter is now before the Crown
Court. On an interlocutory appeal (which failed) the Court of Appeal addressed, but did
not try to resolve, the fraught and ‘plainly very signiﬁcant’ constituent requirement of
dishonesty in the offence.98
There is a new wild card put into play in the shape of the common law. In a case
involving extradition of a British citizen to the United States to stand trial on an
indictment for price ﬁxing in the carbon industry there, it was argued that, the events
having occurred prior to creation of the cartel offence (the Enterprise Act coming into
force in June 2003), the accused could not be extradited owing to the double crimi-
nality rule. True enough as regards the (statutory) cartel offence, but the House of
Lords established that whilst there is no common law offence of price ﬁxing, it could,
in circumstances, constitute the (common law) offence of conspiracy to defraud, and
remitted the case to a district (immigration) judge to determine whether the necessary
constituent elements were present.99 This too requires dishonesty, but the bar might
otherwise be lower than that of the cartel offence.
As for the European Union, it has long been accepted that Union competition law
could not itself be made subject to criminal sanctions, owing essentially to lack of
Community/Union vires in the ﬁeld. But the principle has been eroded. It is now
established in matters of environmental policy that the Union may, through directives,
compel the adoption of criminal sanctions where based upon implicit powers as-
sociated with a speciﬁc legal basis, where there is a clear need to combat serious
shortcomings in the implementation of Union objectives, and where two conditions—
necessity (essentially a proportionality test) and consistency (measures adopted must
respect the overall consistency of the Union’s system(s) of criminal law, whether
adopted on the basis of express authority in criminal matters (ex-third pillar matters) or
normal Union activity—are met.100 Whether or not these tests are met in the ﬁeld of
competition law may be argued, but in light of the environmental law case law the
Commission certainly could, or could try, to provide for criminal sanctions in an
enforcement directive. That it has not may indicate satisfaction with Regulation
95 OFT, decision of 1 August 2007, not yet published.
96 See United States v British Airways, plea agreement in the District Court, District of
Columbia of 23 August 2007.
97 See The Cartel Offence: Guidance on the Issue of No-Action Letters for Individuals,
OFT423.
98 See IB v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 2575, [2009] All ER (D) 90, rejecting an inter-
locutory appeal that the (criminal) courts were barred from proceeding as only a designated
national competition authority within the meaning of Regulation 1/2003 has the power to impose
a ﬁne or other penalty upon a cartel which falls also within the prohibition of Art. 101. For the
discussion of dishonesty see para 27 of the judgment.
99 Norris v Government of the United States of America [2008] UKHL 16, [2008] 1 AC 920.
100 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879; Case C-440/05 Commission v
Council [2007] ECR I-9097; Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the
Council on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 2005 (Case C 176/03
Commission v Council), COM(2005) 583 ﬁnal.
502 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
1/2003 and its plans for civil remedies, or that it does no wish to go down the criminal
route.
E. The Financial Crisis
The Union response to the ongoing ﬁnancial crisis is waged on two competition fronts.
First, the Commission has approved a number of bank (and other ﬁnancial institution)
mergers which it might, in other circumstances, not have done, or at least might have
required modiﬁcation/commitments.101 True, the Commission has not been harsh on
mergers, prohibiting only one concentration since the entry into force of the new
Merger Regulation in 2004,102 but this is generosity (applying essentially failing ﬁrm
criteria) on a much grander scale. Second, in October 2008 it adopted a notice on State
aids applicable to ﬁnancial institutions ‘in the context of the current global ﬁnancial
crisis’ (the banking communication)103 by which it noted that ‘the level of seriousness
that the current crisis in ﬁnancial markets has reached’ was such as to justify scrutiny
of new aids not only under article 107(3)(c) (facilitating the development of certain
economic activities or regions) but article 107(3)(b) (remedying a serious disturbance
in the economy of a member State),104 a category hitherto available exceedingly
sparingly, but here justiﬁed, according to the Commission, owing to the ‘genuinely
exceptional circumstances where the entire functioning of ﬁnancial markets
is jeopardised.’105 In the notice it set out (generous) parameters on its approach to
guarantees covering the liabilities, recapitalisation, controlled winding up of, and other
forms of liquidity assistance to, ﬁnancial institutions, so long as ‘undue distortions’
to competition were avoided. Further notices followed, on recapitalization,106 re-
structuring107 and access to ﬁnance.108 It further undertook to respond swiftly to
any complete notiﬁcation of a State aid, ‘if necessary within 24 hours and over a
101 See Case M.5278 (Banque Fe´de´rative du Cre´dit Mutuel/Citibank Private Banking
Germany), decision of 28 August 2008; Case M.5296 (Deutsche Bank/ABN Amro Assets),
1 October 2008; Case M.5360 (RBSK Group/DZ Bank Group/RZB Group/HVB Banca Pentru
Locuinte), 3 December 2008; Case M.5384 (BNP Paribas/Fortis), 3 December 2008; Case
M.5363 (Banco Santander/Bradford and Bingley Assets), 17 December 2008; Case M.5228
(Rabobank/Bank Gospodarki Z˙ywnos´ciowej), 11 February 2009; Case M.5605 (Cre´dit Mutuel/
Monabanq), 8 September 2009; Case M.5660 (Royal Bank of Scotland/Deutsche Bank/Spin
Holdco), 10 December 2009; Case M.5720 (Bayerische Landesbank/Banque LBLux),
16 December 2009.
102 Case M.4439 (Aer Lingus/Ryanair), decision of 27 June 2007, not yet published; subject to
(partial) review in Case T-411/07 Aer Lingus Group v Commission, pending.
103 Communication from the Commission—The application of State aid rules to measures
taken in relation to ﬁnancial institutions in the context of the current global ﬁnancial crisis, OJ
2008 C270/8; following and adapting the established thinking on rescuing and restructuring ﬁrms
as set out in Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring ﬁrms in difﬁculty,
OJ 2004 C244/2 (the ‘R & R Guidelines’).
104 Banking communication, ibid para 9. 105 ibid para 11.
106 Communication from the Commission—The recapitalisation of ﬁnancial institutions in the
current ﬁnancial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue
distortions of competition, OJ 2009 C10/2.
107 Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring
measures in the ﬁnancial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules, OJ 2009 C195/9.
108 Communication from the commission—Temporary Community framework for State aid
measures to support access to ﬁnance in the current ﬁnancial and economic crisis, OJ 2009 C83/1
(modiﬁed OJ 2009 C303/6).
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weekend.’109 Anyone accustomed to the normal, leisurely Commission pace in these
matters could be forgiven a degree of scepticism, but the Commission has largely been
true to its word. In the eight months following publication of the notice the
Commission approved guarantee measures to the value of E2.9 billion and re-
capitalization measures worth E313 thousand million.110 In December 2009 it ap-
proved, under article 107(3)(b), impaired asset relief measures and the restructuring
plan for the Royal Bank of Scotland of between E70–110 thousand million,111 the
largest amount of State aid disbursed in the Community/Union’s history.
This is uncommon generosity, but these are uncommon times. The Commission is,
maybe, exceeding the limits the Treaty intended and designed for State aids. But to
most it is appropriate ﬂexibility in the face of unprecedented market turmoil. It can be
assumed that the Commission is not unmindful of the possibility that, should it set
about limiting State aids with the vigour it has at its disposal, it would simply be
ignored. And that would have repercussions for the Union far beyond the ﬁelds of State
aids and competition.
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109 Banking communication (n 103) para 53.
110 DG Competition, Review of guarantee and recapitalisation schemes in the ﬁnancial sector
on the current crisis, 7 August 2009, para 7.
111 Cases N422/2009 and N621/2009 (Royal Bank of Scotland), decisions of 14 December
2009, not yet published.
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